says, "We'll steal Brezhnev from you." The Russian's response: "Then you won't have meat."
In the second, a boy comes home from school and says, "Tomorrow I have to bring a ruble to class for the starving people in America." The father says, "I'm not giving you any money-I don't know for a fact that America has starving people." The next day the son comes home again and says, "I have to bring a ruble for the homeless people in America." The father responds, "No, I need evidence that America has homeless people." On the third day, the son says, "I need to give a ruble to the American Communist party." The father immediately takes out three rubles: "Here you go-if the US has a Communist party, I'm sure it has plenty of homeless and starving people." The cynicism acquired under communist rule, instilled in us a critical approach to reality and prevented us from developing real anti-American sentiments.
But to this day, there is still no complete understanding of the colossal differences that separate Russia and the United States. The more Russia integrates with the West, the more it faces the incompatibilities of mentalities, psychologies, lifestyles, and systems of values between the two countries. This is leading Russia to an inevitable psychological breaking point. No one knows what price it will have to pay for this integration-not from a military, political, or economic point of view, but in terms of having to adapt its own cultural and spiritual values. The growing awareness of this inevitability complicates the Russian-American/Western dialogue and amplifies anti-American sentiments in a significant portion of Russian society.
The Russian perception of America can be distinguished by two mindsets. The first is based on deep-seated notions within Russian culture, history, religion, and mentality. These perceptions have been shaped over centuries, and, depend to a great extent, on how Russia has viewed herself and her place in the world, and on how she relates to other countries and cultures, particularly the West and the United States. This perception is a fairly stable assortment of views and judgments, where changes take place slowly and painfully.
Even anti-American propaganda, which the USSR was subjected to over the course of several generations, could not influence this perception decisively. In many ways, its nature is objective. It includes, for instance, the Russian dislike of America's religious pluralism (as Vasily Klyuchevsky wrote, "the West has a church without a God, Russia has a God without a church" 1 ), the doctrine of privacy, 2 and the rule of law. As in a mirror, we can observe fundamental changes occurring within Russia herself in incremental steps. This perception relates to America's own evolution to a much lesser extent.
